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1 Introduction
The housing market has been the main driver of the Spanish economy over the long expansionary cycle
that ended in 2007. More specically, the construction sector had a very high weight over the total
hours worked in Spain (13%) in the period 1996-2007. The weight of the sector was much lower in other
EU economies (8%) or the US (7%). The same can be said about value added. The construction sector
produced 9.9% of the total value added of the Spanish economy while it amounted to 6.3% in the EU
or 4.7% in the US over the same period. The sector, despite the crisis, is still very important in the
Spanish economy, involving in the most recent years (2008-2010) 11% of the hours worked and 13% of
total value added. The housing market in Spain is also su¤ering from structural problems, such as the
pronounced imbalance between home ownership versus rental compared to other European or OECD
countries (see Figure 1 in the Appendix and, among others, Andrews et al. 2011 or Mora-Sanguinetti,
2012) or the concentration of resources and investment in the construction sector (which would not
be disconnected from the above, Arce and López-Salido, 2011). The housing market adjustment and
its consequences have focused the attention of institutions such as the OECD (2010) or the European
Commission (2012), who have called to bridge the gap between tenancy and home ownership and to
mitigate its weight in economic activity. Consequently, accurately evaluating the economic impacts of
housing policies is essential for understanding the overall macroeconomic performance of the Spanish
economy.
Between 2011 and 2012 the Spanish government passed several reform packages focused on the
housing market, a¤ecting both its taxation and its general regulation. Chronologically we can highlight
the following reforms. First, in August 2011 the Government approved the implementation of a super-
reduced VAT for home purchase (up to December 2011). This new VAT was subsequently extended until
December 2012. In December 2011, the government reintroduced the deduction for home purchase for
all income levels for operations taking place in 2012 and retroactively to those which took place in 2011.
In other words, through its reinstitution in 2011, the deduction for home purchase was in force since
its adoption in 19781 (with the exception of a brief period of derogation for high-income taxpayers who
were compensated in 2011). In May 2012 the Council of Ministers presented a package of measures that
included a proposal to reform the Urban Tenancies Act (Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos), some specic
1The deduction was rst introduced in the rst Law of Income Tax on Individuals (IRPF) in 1978. Law 44/1978 of
8 september 1978. This statement is necessarily simplistic since it ignores the changes that have a¤ected the taxation of
housing in that long period (for example, see the discussion provided by Onrubia Fernández et al. 2004).
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procedural measures to speed up the eviction procedures for non-paying (or not-complying) tenants and
some scal measures related to the tenancy market. In the rst group of measures, we can highlight
the reduction in the term of protection against eviction in favor of the tenant (which gets reduced from
5 to 3 years) and the greater freedom to determine the rent paid in the contract (which will not be
necessarily linked to the increase in the CPI anymore).2 With regard to the tax measures, the package
encourages the creation of REITs. Finally, the latest reform package (July 2012) adopted a VAT rate on
the purchase of new housing of 10% (rather than the rate of 4% applied until then) beginning in January
2013 and eliminated the deduction for house purchase for transactions taking place after January 2013.
The potential e¤ects of the abrogation of the deduction are very signicant. It was repeatedly required
by international institutions such as the European Commission (2012) in its assessment of the National
Reform Programme of 2012 of Spain, the IMF (2012) in its Article IV consultation or the OECD in
its Economic Surveys of Spain (2010 and previous surveys). In fact, the OECD (2012) welcomed the
abrogation of the deduction for home purchase (not e¤ective yet at that time) in its Economic Survey of
2012. All those institutions have always required reducing the bias caused by the tax system in favour
of homeownership (versus the rental market) more in general. The deduction itself had also focused the
attention of the academia, which had criticized that it had undesirable redistributive e¤ects (Sanz 2000
or Bilbao Terol et al. 2006) or that it increased housing prices (López-García, 2004) or that it favoured
buying versus renting (López-García, 1996, García-Vaquero and Martínez, 2005, FEDEA, 2009, López-
García, 2010 and all the previous references). At the academic level, following the abrogation of the
deduction in January 2013, the debate is now focused on the discussion of whether the abrogation should
also have been applied retroactively (this discussion clearly exceeds the scope of this paper).3
The aim of this paper is to assess the macroeconomic e¤ects of some of the housing market reforms
passed in Spain in 2012. In particular, in addition to the increase in VAT, we can highlight the long
awaited abrogation of the deduction for home purchase. In order to do that, we use a small-open economy
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated to capture the key ratios of the Spanish
economy. The model includes a housing market, covering both the rental market side and the property
market side and credit-constrained agents. The model follows Ortega, Rubio and Thomas (2011), which is
a valid framework to study housing markets in Spain, but appropriately modied to ensure the evaluation
2These reforms nally came into force in June 2013, with the approval of the Law 4/2013. See Mora-Sanguinetti (2013)
for a rst analysis of these rental market reforms in Spain.
3Most probably, the committee of experts (comité de sabios) developing the tax reform proposal for Spain in 2014 will
introduce, among its recommendations, the total (and retroactive) abrogation of the deduction.
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of the most recent reforms. In particular, this model explicitly includes the existence of possible scal
incentives to housing purchases which would reduce the e¤ective price of housing. Likewise, we introduce
a tax that would be a proxy for the VAT charged on new home purchases. In the model, the government
maintains a balanced budget period by period. The novel contribution of this paper lies on the policy
side. Results show that both measures increase the proportion of rental housing but at the expense
of a negative impact on economic activity. More specically, both measures reduce the activity of the
construction sector and reduce real housing prices. The e¤ects are stronger in the case of the abrogation
of the deduction for home purchase than in the case of the VAT increase.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the DSGE model used to simulate the impact
of the measures analyzed, Section 3 shows the dynamics of the model, Section 4 provides the results of
the simulations and nally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model setup
In order to appropriately capture the Spanish structure, we consider a small-open economy inside a
monetary union. We denote the home country by A and the rest of the union by B. In the home country,
there are savers and borrowers which di¤er in their discount factors. Savers consume goods produced
domestically and abroad, derive utility from housing, and work. They can also trade nancial assets both
domestically and internationally. Countries are in a monetary union in which the euro is the common
currency, therefore assets are denominated in euros and there is no need for an exchange rate system. As
in Iacoviello (2005), borrowers are more impatient than savers and need collateral to obtain loans. There
are two production sectors: the construction sector and the consumption goods sector. For simplicity,
housing is a non-tradable good. Consumption goods prices are sticky. As in Ortega, Rubio and Thomas
(2011), houses can be bought or rented. In order to study the recent reforms in Spanish housing markets,
there are both scal incentives to house purchases and a VAT tax applied to new homes. We assume
that subsidies are nanced by distortionary taxes; in particular, we consider a tax on wage income.4
Monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank and scal policy is implemented at the country
level.5
4This is a positive paper, welfare implications are not analysed. In order to determine which scal consolidation scheme
would be more e¢ cient for the economy a welfare analysis should be made. We leave this for further research.
5 In this paper, for simplicity, we consider borrowers and savers within the country, we abstract from the issue that there
might be a geographical division between borrowers and savers.
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2.1 Savers
Savers in Country A choose consumption, housing and labor in order to maximize
W s0 = E0
1X
t=0
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s)t
 
logCst + # logH
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t  
(Lst )
1+
1 + 
!
;
where s is the saversdiscount factor, # is the weight of utility from housing services, Hst is savers
stock of owner-occupied housing, and Lst is a composite of labor supply to the consumption sector (L
s
ct)
and the housing sector (Lsht),
Lst =
h
!
1="l
l (L
s
ct)
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:
where !l is a weight parameter and "l is the elasticity of substitution between labor types. Savers
consume a basket of domestically and foreign produced goods, given by
Cst = (C
s
At)
 (CsBt)
1  ;
where Csjt are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators of consumption goods varieties produced in country j = A;B,
and  > 0 measures the degree of home bias in consumption. The households nominal budget constraint
is given by
PAtC
s
At + PBtC
s
Bt +Q
h
t

(1  h) (1 + V AT )
 
Hst   (1  )Hst 1

+
 
Hzt   (1  )Hzt 1

+Bt +Dt =
(1  wt) (WctLsct +WhtLsht) +QztZt +RAt 1Bt 1 +Rt 1 
  Dt 1
PAt 1Yt 1

Dt 1 + PAtFt;
where PAt is the nominal price index of nal consumption goods produced in Country A, PBt is the
corresponding index for goods produced in Country B, Qht is the nominal price of houses, h is the
deduction on purchases of owner-occupied houses, V AT is a value added tax rate on housing purchases,
Bt and Dt are domestic and foreign nominal debt held by savers, respectively, wt is the time-varying tax
rate on wage income, Wct and Wht are nominal wages in the consumption goods and the housing sector,
respectively, RAt is the nominal interest rate on domestic bonds, and Rt is the nominal ECB rate. In
order to ensure stationarity of equilibrium, we follow Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2001) and assume that
domestic agents pay a risk premium   which is strictly increasing in the countrys net foreign debt to
output ratio, ( Dt) = (PAtYt). We assume that the risk-premium takes the form   (x) = e x, with  > 0.
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Ft are rmsreal prots rebated to savers every period. Savers use a certain part of their housing stock,
which we denote by Hzt , to produce rental services Zt according to the production function Zt = AzH
z
t .
The parameter Az measures the e¢ ciency of the rental market and will serve as a proxy of the e¢ ciency
of institutions to enforce rental contracts. Rental services are sold competitively to borrowers at a unit
nominal price Qzt . The parameter  is the depreciation rate of houses. We can rewrite the budget
constraint in terms of producer prices in Country A,
CsAt + pBtC
s
Bt + q
h
t

(1  h) (1 + V AT )
 
Hst   (1  )Hst 1

+
 
Hzt   (1  )Hzt 1

+ bt + dt
= (1  wt) (wctLsct + whtLsht) + qztAzHzt +
RAt 1bt 1
At
+
Rt 1e ( dt 1)=Yt 1dt 1
At
+ Ft;
where At  PAt=PAt 1 denotes domestic PPI ination, pBt  PBt=PAt is the price of foreign goods in
terms of home goods (that is, the terms of trade), qht  Qht =PAt and qzt  Qzt =PAt denote real house
prices and real rental rates, respectively, wct and wht are real wages in each sector, and we have dened
bt  Bt=PAt and dt  Dt=PAt. The rst order conditions of the maximization problem are the following,
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Equation (1) equates relative prices to the marginal rate of substitution between the goods produced in
Countries A and B. Equation (2) is the rst order condition for owner-occupied housing, which equates
the marginal utility of housing services to the e¤ective (i.e. subsidy and VAT-adjusted) user cost of
housing. Equation (3) is the Euler Equation for domestic bonds. Equation (4) follows from no arbitrage
6
between domestic and foreign bonds. Equations (5) and (6) are the rst order conditions for labor supply
in the consumption and housing sector, respectively. Equation (7) is the rst order condition for house
purchases for production of rental services.
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers have a discount factor b < s and maximize
W b0 = E0
1X
t=0

b
t 
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;
where Cbt =
 
CbAt
  
CbBt
1 
is a consumption basket,
Lbt =

!
1="l
l

Lbct
(1+"l)="l
+ (1  !l)1="l

Lbht
(1+"l)="l"l=(1+"l)
(8)
is a composite of labor services in both sectors analogous to that of savers and
~Hbt =

!
1="h
h

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(9)
is a composite of housing services provided by owner-occupied and rented houses, where Hbt is borrowers
stock of owned houses and Zt are rental services. Therefore, borrowers derive utility both from living in
owner-occupied houses and in rented houses.6 Maximization is subject to the following budget constraint,
written in terms of domestic producer prices,
CbAt + pBtC
b
Bt + q
h
t (1  h) (1 + V AT )
h
Hbt   (1  )Hbt 1
i
+ qztZt +
RAt 1bt 1
At
= (1  wt)

wctL
b
ct + whtL
b
ht

+ bt; (10)
6This does not literally mean that each borrower lives simultaneously in an owned house and in a rented house. Instead,
our interpretation is that there exists a large representative borrower-type household with a continuum of members, some
of which live in owner-occupied houses and the rest of which live in rented houses. Our composite index in equation (9)
thus represents the aggregate preferences of all household members with respect to each kind of housing services. As an
alternative modelling approach, Gervais (2002) considers a framework where agents decide endogenously whether to buy a
house or rent.
On the other hand, notice that savers do not demand rental housing services, unlike the case of borrowers. We do this for
simplicity. However, results not reported here but available upon request show that, under the assumption of homogeneous
preferences across savers and borrowers, our quantitative results are only marginally a¤ected.
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Borrowers are also subject to a collateral constraint which limits the amount of borrowing (gross of
interest payments) to a fraction m of the expected resale value of their houses,7
bt  m
RAt
EtAt+1q
h
t+1H
b
t : (11)
The rst order conditions of this problem are the following,
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where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint. These rst order conditions are inter-
preted analogously to the ones of savers. An important di¤erence is the demand for owner-occupied
housing, equation (16). The latter equates the marginal utility of owner-occupied housing to the e¤ec-
tive user cost of housing minus the marginal collateral value of housing. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an
increase in the collateral value of housing (due for instance to an expected increase in house prices) has
a positive e¤ect on borrowersdemand for owner-occupied housing.
7The fact that borrowers are more impatient than savers guarantees that the collateral constraint is binding in the steady
state. Provided the shocks to the economy are small enough, the constraint also binds over the business cycle.
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2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Construction rms
New homes are produced using the following technology,
IHt = L
s
ht + L
b
ht; (18)
where IHt is residential investment, Lsht and L
b
ht are saversand borrowerssupply of labor in the housing
sector, respectively. Free entry in the construction sector implies the following zero prot condition,
wht = q
h
t : (19)
2.3.2 Intermediate good producers
The intermediate good market is perfectly competitive. The homogenous intermediate good is produced
according to the following technology,
Yt = L
s
ct + L
b
ct; (20)
where Lsct and L
b
ct are saversand borrowerssupply of labor in the consumption goods sector, respectively.
Free entry in this sector implies the following zero prot condition,
wct = p
I
t ; (21)
where pIt is the real price of the intermediate good, that is, the real marginal cost for nal consumption
goods producers.
2.3.3 Final consumption goods producers
Final consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms. Prices
in the nal goods sector are set in a staggered fashion according to the Calvo (1983) mechanism. This
implies the following (log-linear approximation of the) New Keynesian Phillips Curve for domestic PPI
ination,
log At = 
s log At+1 +
(1  ) (1  s)

log

pIt
"p
"p   1

; (22)
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where  is the probability of rms not changing prices, "p is the elasticity of substitution across nal
goods, and "p= ("p   1) is the steady-state markup.
2.4 Fiscal policy
For simplicity, we assume that the government balances its budget period by period. That is,
wt
h
wct

Lsct + L
b
ct

+ wht

Lsht + L
b
ht
i
= (h   V AT ) qht
h
Hst   (1  )Hst 1 +Hbt   (1  )Hbt 1
i
:
(23)
Therefore, the government levies taxes on wage income in order to nance its subsidies to rental payments
and to house purchases.
2.5 Market clearing and international linkages
Housing market clearing implies Ht = Hst +H
z
t +H
b
t , where the total supply of houses evolves according
to Ht = IHt + (1  )Ht 1. Combining the latter two conditions, we have that
IHt = H
s
t   (1  )Hst 1 +Hzt   (1  )Hzt 1 +Hbt   (1  )Hbt 1: (24)
The aggregate resource constraint for domestically-produced consumption goods can be expressed as
Yt = C
s
At + C
b
At + 
pBtct ;
where ct is aggregate consumption in the rest of the monetary union and  is a foreign preference
parameter. For future reference, we dene real gross domestic product as GDPt  Yt + qht IHt. Terms
of trade evolve according to
pBt =
Bt
At
pB;t 1;
where Bt is both PPI and CPI ination in the rest of the union.8 The ECB nominal interest rate follows
a Taylor rule that responds smoothly to deviations of EMU-wide ination from its long-run target (which
we normalize to 1),
Rt = (1=)
1 R RRt 1
(1+)(1 R)
Bt exp (eR;t) ;
where R is a smoothing parameter,  captures the policy response to ination, and eR;t is an iid shock.
8Remember that the home country is assumed to be small relative to the rest of the monetary union.
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The home countrys net foreign asset position (per capita) follows
dt =
Rt 1e ( dt 1)=Yt 1
At
dt 1 + Yt   CsAt   CbAt   pBt

CsBt + C
b
Bt

: (25)
The model can be closed by means of two equations that determine foreign consumption demand (ct ) and
foreign ination (Bt). We assume for simplicity that both variables (in logs) follow AR(1) processes,
with means normalized to zero.
3 Dynamics
3.1 Calibration
For calibration, we follow Ortega, Rubio and Thomas (2011) to match the ratios of the model with
the key average ratios found for the Spanish economy, mostly for the period 1997-2008.9 The home
bias parameter, , is set to match the share of Spanish goods in private consumption, which in the
model is exactly equal to .10 The e¢ ciency in the production of rental services, Az, is chosen to
replicate the rent-to-house-price ratio, given by qz=qh = (1  s (1  )) =Az in the models steady state.
Notice that the latter two steady-state ratios are invariant to changes in housing subsidies and taxes (h,
V AT ). The relative weight on utility from housing services, #, and the weight parameters in the CES
baskets of labor supply and housing services, !l and !h respectively, are jointly chosen by minimizing
the sum of square distances between four steady-state ratios in the model and their corresponding data
counterparts. These ratios are the shares of rented houses and mortgaged houses in the aggregate housing
stock, Hz=H and Hb=H respectively, the share of residential investment in GDP, qhIH=GDP , and the
share of construction in total employment, Lh= (Lc + Lh), where Li  Lsi + Lbi is total labor in sector
i = c; h. The values for these parameters, together with all other parameters, are reported in Table 1,
whereas the resulting model steady-state ratios are compared to their data counterparts in Table 2.
9Notice that, even though the EMU regime started in 1999, by 1997 EMU membership was anticipated by most agents,
and in practice Spain had xed exchange rate with respect to the rest of the EMU in that period.
10The foreign preference parameter is set such that terms of trade in the steady state are normalized to one, producing
 = 1:256.
11
Table 1: Parameter Values
s=b 0:99=0:97 Discount factor of savers / borrowers
# 0:143 Relative weight on utility from housing services
!l 0:214 Weight parameter in labor services aggregator
!h 0:787 Weight parameter in housing services aggregator
"l 1 Elasticity of substitution between labor types
"h 2 Elasticity of substitution between home ownership and rent
 0:01 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
"p 6 Elasticity of substitution among nal goods
 0:663 Home bias in consumption
Az 1:621 E¢ ciency in production of rental housing services
 0:01 Depreciation rate of the housing stock
m 0:70 Loan-to-value ratio
 0:75 Calvo parameter
h 0:15 Subsidy rate house purchases for owner occupation
V AT 0:04 VAT rate for house purchases
R 0:8 Coe¢ cient on lagged nominal interest rate in the Taylor rule
 1:5 Coe¢ cient on area-wide ination in the Taylor rule
 0:01 Elasticity of risk premium with respect to net foreign asset position
Table 2: Steady-State Ratios of the Spanish Economy
Data Model Data Sources
Housing rental Share 0:122 0:139 INE, Censo de Población y Vivienda 2001
Share of housing with mortgage 0:305 0:322 Asociación Española de Banca, 2003-2008
Rent over housing price 0:012 0:012 Ministerio de Vivienda, 1997-2008
Residential investment / GDP 0:073 0:073 Spanish National Accounts, 1997-2008
Construction labor share 0:138 0:138 INE, Encuesta de Población Activa, 1997-2008
Share home goods in consumption 0:663 0:663 Spanish National Accounts, 1997-2008
This way, as shown in Table 2, the model reproduces the average proportion of residential investment
over GDP, 7.3% , as well as the weight of employment in construction over total employment (13.8%).
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The rental share in the model is 13.9% (slightly above 12,2%, found in the data)11. The share of housing
with mortgages is 32.2% in the model (also slightly above the average found in the period 1997-2008,
30.5%).
The remaining parameters are set to standard values in the literature. For savers, we use a discount
factor that corresponds to an annual interest rate of 4%. For borrowers, we use a slightly lower discount
factor, in line with the literature on DSGE models with housing and nancial frictions. Following
Horvath (2000), we set the elasticity of substitution between labor types, "l, to one. For the elasticity
of substitution between services from home ownership and rent, "h, unfortunately there are no reliable
estimates in the literature. We take the value of 2 as our baseline in order to make households more
sensitive to the relative price of houses and rents than would be the case under lower values. Ortega et al.
(2011) perform a sensitivity analysis for this parameter and nd that the qualitative results are largely
una¤ected by this parameter. We choose the inverse elasticity of labor supply, , following Iacoviello
(2005).12 The value for the elasticity of substitution among nal goods, "p, implies a markup of 20% in
the steady state, a value commonly found in the literature.13 We set the housing depreciation rate to
0.01, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). We use 0.70 for the loan-to-value ratio, consistently with data from
the European Mortgage Federation (Spain Factsheet 2009).14 The probability of not changing prices, ,
is set to 0.75, implying that prices change every four quarters on average. The coe¢ cients in the Taylor
Rule are set to 0.8 for the lagged interest rate and 1.5 for ination, as proposed by Taylor (1993). The
elasticity of the international risk-premium,  , is set to a standard value of 0.01. The subsidy for house
purchases in Spain is set to h = 0:15, consistently with the current 15% income tax deduction for house
purchases. The V AT rate is initially set to 4%.
4 Policy Evaluation
4.1 Simulations
Of all the reforms outlined in the introduction, we are going to focus on the scal measures. The
model includes a subsidy for house purchase, as a proxy for the deduction for home purchase, that we
calibrate at 15%. In addition, the model also includes a VAT tax applicable for new house purchases
11Censo de población y vivienda, INE, 2001.
12This value implies a virtually at labor supply curve, higher than microeconomic estimates but rationalizing the weak
observed response of real wages to macroeconomic disturbances.
13See for instance Blanchard and Galí (2008).
14The actual value published by the European Mortgage Federation is 67.5%.
13
that we calibrate at 4%. Therefore, the simulations we perform are the following: First, we simulate
separately (thus allowing us to isolate the e¤ect of each measure) the e¤ects of eliminating the subsidy
for homeownership (from 15% to 0%) and the VAT increase on the purchase of new homes (from 4% to
10%). Second, we jointly simulate the rise in the VAT rate and the abrogation of the deduction for home
purchases, while both measures have been implemented jointly from January 2013. In the simulations,
it is assumed that the two measures are permanent and that their application is immediate (as in fact
it was the case).
Changes in the tax system a¤ect the new housing e¤ective user cost. Therefore, this has an impact
on housing demand and supply, which determine house prices. In turn, changes in house prices have
an e¤ect on the value of collateral for borrowers, which a¤ects their borrowing capacity and ultimately
their consumption. In this way, these scal measures are transmitted to the macroeconomy.
Note that both measures generate tax savings. To determine the net e¤ect on the economy of the
reform as a whole it is important to determine how those savings are used. The model incorporates
two assumptions about their use. First, as noted above, the government maintains a balanced budget.
Second, the scal mechanism used to balance the budget is a tax on labor income. Thus, tax savings
originated by the two measures are used to reduce other distortionary taxes.15
As for the reform measures in the rental market (the reduction in the term of protection of the tenant
against eviction and the liberalization of the rents), it is di¢ cult to evaluate them rigorously inside a
DSGE model given its structure. Note that the model includes a technological parameter, Az, that
approximates the e¢ ciency of the functioning of the rental market. This parameter would thus include
everything related to the institutional design of the market, such as the regulation or the quality of
the enforcement institutions, however it is not possible to quantify to what extent the parameter would
change as a result of the implementation of the most recent reforms.
4.2 Results
The following tables show the e¤ects on a number of macroeconomic variables of both the increase in
the VAT rate on new housing purchases (from 4 to 10%) and the abrogation of the deduction for home
purchases. Tables 3 and 4 display the isolated e¤ect of each measure, while Table 5 shows the joint e¤ect
15 In the model, the deduction for home purchase is set as a percentage of the value of the dwelling and it is received in full
and instantaneously at the time of purchase. However, in reality, the buyer benets from it all over the period of repayment
of the mortgage (with a maximum deduction each year of repayment). This means that in the model, the reduction in
public spending due to the abrogation of the subsidies is faster than expected. This in turn a¤ects the reduction in the tax
on wage income.
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of both measures. In each case, we can see the average annual e¤ects during the rst four years after
the measures take place (short and medium run), as well as the long-run e¤ects, once the economy has
reached the new steady state.
In the model, both the tax deduction removal and the VAT increase have similar qualitative e¤ects.
Both measures imply, ceteris paribus, an increase in the new housing e¤ective user cost. Thus, households
decrease their housing demand and this, in turn, reduces residential investment. The shrink in the
construction sector contracts GDP and total employment, especially in the short run, while the e¤ects
gradually fade out in the long run.
The fall in housing demand makes housing prices decrease very sharply in the short run. In the
long run, housing prices fall 7.5% in the case of the subsidy removal, and 2.8% for the VAT increase.
Given that houses are an asset that serve as collateral for borrowing, this decrease in housing prices
means that collateral is worth less and borrowers are more limited to access credit markets.16 Therefore,
borrowers are able to consume and invest less. This wealth e¤ect amplies the negative implications of
both measures through a nancial accelerator mechanism.
Table 3: VAT Increase Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Long Run
GDP, % -0.21 -0.23 -0.22 -0.21 -0.03
Employment, % -0.47 -0.50 -0.49 -0.47 -0.21
Construction over GDP, pp -0.54 -0.54 -0.53 -0.52 -0.36
% Employment on Construction, pp -0.48 -0.50 -0.49 -0.48 -0.33
Real Housing Price, % -4.29 -4.21 -4.13 -4.04 -2.79
% Rental Sector, pp 1.95 1.95 1.94 1.93 1.90
% Houses with mortgages, pp -2.02 -2.00 -2.00 -1.99 -1.94
16The model assumes that housing is used as collateral, not only for mortgages but also for consumption loans. This is
less common in Spain than in anglosaxon countries, where this mortgage equity withdrawal is more popular.
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Table 4: Deduction Removal Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Long Run
GDP, % -0.84 -0.67 -0.61 -0.57 -0.08
Employment, % -1.61 -1.41 -1.33 -1.27 -0.57
Construction over GDP, pp -1.45 -1.39 -1.36 -1.34 -0.94
% Employment on Construction, pp -1.40 -1.33 -1.30 -1.27 -0.88
Real Housing Price, % -11.48 -11.16 -10.91 -10.69 -7.45
% Rental Sector, pp 5.94 5.91 5.91 5.90 5.78
% Houses with mortgages, pp -5.63 -5.58 -5.57 -5.56 -5.37
Table 5: Both Measures Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Long Run
GDP, % -1.29 -0.92 -0.81 -0.74 -0.09
Employment, % -2.32 -1.86 -1.72 -1.64 -0.73
Construction over GDP, pp -1.88 -1.77 -1.73 -1.70 -1.21
% Employment on Construction, pp -1.90 -1.71 -1.67 -1.64 -1.14
Real Housing Price, % -14.84 -14.35 -14.01 -13.73 -9.60
% Rental Sector, pp 8.17 8.14 8.13 8.12 7.95
% Houses with mortgages, pp -7.40 -7.35 -7.34 -7.32 -7.06
On the other hand, there is a substitution e¤ect. Now, in relative terms, the owner-occupied housing
user cost increases with respect to the one of rentals. Thus, after these measures are applied, renting
is comparatively more attractive than purchasing. In this way, after the subsidy removal, the rental
market share increase is about 5.8 p.p. in the long run. The VAT measure implies an increase of 1.9
p.p. in the rental market share.
Finally, in both cases, the government increases its revenues. Therefore, to keep the budget balanced,
as assumed in the model, the labor income taxes decrease.17 This increases the labor supply and in turn
consumption goods production. Then, this increase in production partially o¤sets the fall in construction.
Overall, this limits the total GDP decrease, especially in the long run, where GDP falls less than 0.1%
in all cases.18
17Recall that in the model the scal saving due to the subsidy removal happens at a faster pace than in reality. Therefore,
the e¤ects on the labor income taxes are more realistic in the long run than in the short/medium run.
18This benecial e¤ect on GDP happens because of the introduction of distortionary taxes. If the model included
lump-sum taxes in order to balance the budget, the negative long-run e¤ects on GDP would not be o¤set.
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Given that both measures have e¤ects going in the same direction, when we jointly evaluate the
policies, the argument is similar but with larger e¤ects. The e¤ects of both measures are accumulated.
In this way, as shown in Table 5, the introduction of both measures at the same time as an e¤ect on
housing prices of -9.6% in the long run, while the increase in the rental market is almost 8 p.p. The
decrease in GDP is relatively large in the short run (1.3% in the rst year), and quite small in the long
run (0.1%).19
5 Concluding remarks
The housing market, even during the current recession, remains one of the sectors with the highest
weight in the Spanish economy, both in terms of value added and number of hours worked. Therefore,
a rigorous assessment of its performance is essential to analyze the functioning of the whole economy in
Spain.
This paper evaluates the e¤ects on the main macroeconomic variables of the Spanish economy of two
alternative measures to reform the housing market: the abrogation of the deduction for home purchase
and an increase in the VAT rate charged in the purchase of a new home. To do this we used an analytical
framework consisting of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that includes a housing
market, with houses in both the rental and ownership sides, and credit-constrained agents. The model
has been calibrated to reect the key ratios of the Spanish economy.
This type of analysis, based on general equilibrium models is useful for understanding economic
performance while models isolate the e¤ect of a particular measure. More specically, the models tell
us which of the macroeconomic variables which characterizes an economy are most a¤ected by a new
policy measure and in what direction the changes will occur.
Results show that both measures increase the proportion of rental housing in the economy which is
in line with the recommendations of international institutions (in this respect, see the previously cited
reports of the European Commission, the IMF or the OECD). However, both measures have a negative
impact on economic activity. More specically, both measures reduce the activity of the construction
sector implying a fall in total GDP and employment (this point is not always reected in the previously
cited academic papers for being sometimes partial equilibrium analyses). Both measures also reduce real
housing prices (as discussed, this result is in line with what it was envisaged by López-García, 2004,
19Notice that in this paper we do not consider the reallocation of housing investment to other more productive activities.
For a discussion on this issue, see Arce et al. (2008).
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for the case of the abrogation of the deduction for home purchase). The e¤ects are more pronounced
in the case of the abrogation of the deduction for home purchase than in the case of the VAT increase.
Together, both measures accumulate their e¤ects, since these e¤ects go in the same direction.20
Facing the nal e¤ect of the measures on the economy as a whole, it is very important to evaluate how
the scal revenues generated by these measures are used. Thus, under the assumption that greater scal
savings created by the two measures are used to reduce distortionary taxes on wages, the consequent
stimulation of labor supply and production of consumer goods would end up greatly limiting the negative
e¤ects on the GDP of the measures analyzed, especially in the long term.
In sum, the results of the model would suggest that the (long awaited) abrogation of the deduction
for house purchase and the VAT increase would drive down housing prices and would have a negative
impact on output and employment in the construction sector. However, in the long run, this negative
impact could be o¤set by the benecial e¤ect of a reduction in distortionary taxes.
20We do not contemplate if the measures discussed in this paper should have been introduced retroactively. This is out
of the scope of our research question.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Share of rented dwellings in Spain and other EU countries
Source: Statistical Data Warehouse (2007) and the « Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares
» for the case of Spain.
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